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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter as appellant State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company (State Farm) timely filed a petition for interlocutory appeal of the trial 
court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of plaintiff s motion 
for summary judgment. Jurisdiction is granted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2A-
2(2)(j). State Farm's petition was granted by this court in accordance with Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 5. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issues presented. Did the insurance policy at issue provide coverage for the 
allegations of the Fennell complaint so as to trigger the duty to defend? 
Standard of review. The issue presented involves the interpretation of a contract 
and is a legal conclusion. Accordingly, the issue presented is reviewed for correctness 
with no deference given to the trial court. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Constr., 983 P.2d 
575, 577 (Utah 1999). Moreover, these issues were before the court on motions for 
summary judgment. Determinations of summary judgment are likewise reviewed for 
correctness. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ^  11, 27 P.3d 555. 
Issue preserved. This issue was preserved with the trial court by way of State 
Farm's motion for summary judgment and Edward Green's (Green) cross-motion. The 
order denying the motion for summary judgment and granting Green's motion was 
executed by the trial court on August 24, 2004. See Ruling and Order attached as 
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Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of an allegation that State Farm improperly withdrew its 
defense of Green in a lawsuit which had been filed against Green by Mr. Fennell State 
Farm withdrew the defense after concluding that there was no coverage under the policy 
for the allegations of the complaint. 
The Fennell Lawsuit. On April 7, 2000 James Fennell filed a complaint against 
Edward Green and others. (R.48). A copy of the complaint is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. The Fennell lawsuit claimed that Green was "one of two professional 
subdividers of land" connected with the sale of a lot to Mr. Fennell. (R.49 f^ 4). Green 
subdivided a set of lots, which were then sold to third parties, one of whom sold lot 31 to 
Mr. Fennell. (R.49-50). Mr. Fennell claimed in his lawsuit that Green knew or should 
have known of the subject lot's propensity or predisposition for unstable soils, 
particularly that the lot was subject to landslides and erosion. (R.51 % 13; R.52 f^ 19-R.53 
f 20). Particularly, Fennell claimed that had he known of this information he would not 
have purchased the lot. (R.53 ^ 19; R.54 ^[25). Mr. Fennell claims that Green should have 
disclosed this fact to Mr. Fennell and that Mr. Fennell was damaged by this lack of 
disclosure. Mr. Fennell stated three causes of action in his lawsuit, those being negligent 
failure to disclose, intentional failure to disclose, and breach of an implied warranty. 
(R.52-56). During the pendency of the Fennell lawsuit, Mr. Fennell filed an amended 
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complaint which added a fourth cause of action, but only against an unrelated defendant 
and not against Mr. Green. (R. 121-135). 
There was no allegation in the complaint that Green or his geotechnical 
subcontractors failed to use appropriate testing methods or that Green improperly relied 
upon these testing methods.1 Instead, the allegations of the complaint state that the 
geotechnical tests or other information put Green on notice that the soil on the lot was 
unstable. (R. 50 f 7; R.51 % 14). The complaint states: 
As part of the subdivision process for Falcon Ridge Phase II, defendants Green 
and Wall hired a professional geologist to conduct a geological soil investigation 
of the area and received reports of the investigation dated October 7, 1992 and 
October 9, 1992. The reports, among other things, indicate that presence of a 
landslide and sloughing at the site at what is now designated as Lot 31. To address 
and mitigate the landslide and sloughing problem, the report recommended that a 
20-foot wide road right-of-way be placed inside the top of the scarp on Lot 31.2 
(R.50 f 7). The complaint continues in paragraph 8 (R.50): 
The subdivision plat of land comprising Falcon Ridge Phase II was recorded by 
defendants Green and Wall on April 22, 1994. Lot 31 was designated as a 
building lot without containing the information and recommendation of the 
geologist aforesaid. 
!This is an important distinction since plaintiff asked the trial court to "infer" (1) 
that Green or a subcontractor had failed to use appropriate testing methods, (2) 
negligently relied upon negligent testing, (3) negligently reviewed data, and (4) failed to 
appreciate the report of the geologist. Actually, the opposite is alleged in the complaint; 
that is, the geologist's tests identified a problem which was relayed to Green, but that 
information was not passed on to others. 
2There is no allegation that the geologist performed his duties in any negligent 
manner. Instead, it is alleged that the information was in fact given to Green and his 
partner. 
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The complaint continues in paragraph 14 (R.51) in pertinent part: 
Defendants Green and Wall knew the geologist recommended a road right-of-way 
be placed on Lot 31 to address and mitigate the landslide and erosion problem. 
Whereas, plaintiff had no knowledge of said matters nor should he had known 
until the landslide of April 14, 1998. 
Specifically as to the negligent failure to disclose in paragraph 19 (R.52), plaintiff claims: 
In purchasing Lot 31 and constructing our home thereon, plaintiff relied on the 
lack of disclosures from defendants that Lot 31 was other than suitable for 
housing. Plaintiff relied on the lack of disclosure from defendants that Lot 31 was 
the site of landslides and erosion. Plaintiff relied on lack of disclosure from 
defendants Green and Wall that the geologist recommended a road right-of-way be 
placed at the site of Lot 31 to address the landslide and erosion problem. Had the 
disclosures all of which are material been made as they should have been, plaintiff 
would not have purchased this lot nor constructed a home thereon. 
The Fennell complaint contains no allegation that Green caused the landslide, only 
that he failed to disclose the property's propensity to slide. The sum and substance of the 
Fennell complaint is that Green represented the lot as buildable when it was not. (R.49 f 
6; R.50 % 7; R.53 ^19; R.54 ^25). 
Ultimately, Mr. Green moved for summary judgment in the Fennell lawsuit 
maintaining, in part, that the lawsuit was barred by the economic loss rule. Green 
prevailed in his motion for summary judgment and the matter was appealed and a 
decision was rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals on August 21, 2003. (R.92). See 
Fennell v. Green, 2003 Ut. App. 291, 77 P.3d 339. 
The Defense Of Green. When the Fennell lawsuit was first brought against Mr. 
Green, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company assumed the defense of the action, but 
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issued to Mr. Green a reservation of rights letter indicating that there were questions 
regarding whether the claims of the underlying lawsuit were covered by the policy and 
reserving its rights to disclaim coverage. (R.248). Subsequently, State Farm determined 
that there was no coverage under the policy for any of the claims stated in the complaint, 
even if they proved to be true. As a result, the defense of Green was withdrawn. (R.251) 
The policy of insurance applicable to this matter (R. 15-46) provides: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury or 
advertising injury to which this insurance applies . . . . This insurance 
applies only: 
1. to bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence that 
takes place in the coverage territory during the policy period. 
(R.27). Green's policy of insurance contains the following pertinent definitions (R.37-
41): 
Occurrence means: 
(a) an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions which result in 
bodily injury or property damage. 
Property damage means: 
1. physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including all 
resulting loss of use of that property; or 
2. loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured or 
destroyed, provided such loss of use is caused by physical injury to 
or destruction of other tangible property. 
Green's policy of insurance provides for the following exclusions (R.28-31): 
[T]his insurance does not apply: 
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1. to bodily injury or property damage: 
a. expected or intended from the standpoint of the insuredf.] 
10. to bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury due to 
rendering or failure to render any professional services or treatments. 
This includes but is not limited to: 
b. engineering, drafting, surveying or architectural services, 
including preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or 
approve maps, drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change 
orders, designs or specifications[.] 
State Farm's policy provides that State Farm will defend any suit "seeking 
damages payable under this policy." In other words, the defense clause is triggered only 
by a suit "seeking damages payable under this policy." If the damages sought in the 
lawsuit are not payable under the policy (in other words covered), there is no resultant 
duty to defend. 
Green testified in his deposition that he was only aware of those claims listed in 
the lawsuit. (R.93 f 12). Green never received a letter from Mr. Fennell with arty claims 
and Green's knowledge of the claims presented were limited to those in the lawsuit. To 
Green's knowledge no one has ever claimed that actual physical preparation of the lot 
was wrongful in any way. (R.93 1fl4). 
Mr. Green understood that his policy was a written policy and would not cover him 
for everything, but there would be exceptions. Specifically, Mr. Green would have not 
expected the State Farm policy would defend him in a lawsuit for breach of contract, nor 
for a criminal act, or for fraud. Mr. Green also acknowledged that if he acted 
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intentionally, the policy may not cover him. (R.94 f 17-19). 
During the deposition of Green, his attorney stipulated: 
What he has testified to is that the complaints of Mr. Fennell he is aware of are 
encompassed within the four corners of the complaint and all reasonable 
assumptions and ideas and thoughts and theories that could flow from them. Since 
this is a notice state, they are put on notice of certain types and kinds of claims and 
those were all encompassed within the complaint. And he is not aware of any 
other claims. 
(R.93U15). 
All of the above-stated facts were deemed admitted by Green's failure to comply 
with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.3 First, Green failed to set forth a 
verbatim statement of the facts being controverted. Actually, when the responses are 
reviewed, the statements of fact are not controverted at all. In no instance does Green 
support by citation any relevant materials. Particularly, no citation is made to affidavits 
or discovery materials. 
The same can be said for the additional facts set forth in the opposing memoranda. 
The facts are not separately stated, not separately numbered, and are not supported by a 
citation to affidavits, discovery materials, or otherwise admissible evidence. 
3Rule 7(c)(3)(B) provides: "A memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim statement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each 
of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an 
explanation of the grounds for any dispute, support by citation to relevant materials, such 
as affidavits or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing 
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and supported by citation 
to supporting materials such as affidavits or discovery materials." 
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Nevertheless, even if the court considers the facts improperly put before it, the result does 
not change. 
Green asserted the following additional facts. Supposedly, in April of 1999 a 
notice of claim was served upon Layton City for alleged damages incurred as a result of 
landslides on or about the 17th day of April 1998 and thereafter at Fennell's premises.4 
On June 11, 1999, Mr. Stark, the attorney for Mr. Fennell, wrote to Ed Green and 
Neil Wall advising them that "On April 17, 1998, the back of the lot near the house 
started sliding away. As a result, the lot was substantially destroyed and the home and lot 
rendered valueless." On June 16, 1999 Mr. Buehler representing Green and Neil Wall, 
refuted those allegations and indicated that even though there may be some cognizable 
standard of duty, there existed no breach of any duty which would impose liability upon 
Green or Wall for the landslide. (R.179). On October 11, 1999 Mr. Buehler wrote to 
State Farm and forwarded correspondence out of his file in order that State Farm might 
make a determination as to coverage and liability. (R.238). On March 3, 2000 a State 
Farm representative wrote to Mr. Stark indicating that State Farm had obtained a report 
regarding the stabilization of the Fennell lot which would be later forwarded to Mr. Stark. 
(R.240). On or about May 8, 2000, State Farm engaged the services of Paul Belnap of the 
4State Farm disputed this paragraph as there existed no evidence that State Farm 
ever knew of the existence of the document. Further, the statement is irrelevant s ince it 
does not state a claim against Green, but only against Layton City. The claim against 
Layton City is not mentioned in the Fennell lawsuit. 
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law firm Strong & Hanni to defend Green from the claims and allegations asserted by the 
Fennell lawsuit. (R.246). On May 11, State Farm forwarded to Green a reservation of 
rights letter which indicated that State Farm was reserving the right to deny coverage 
based upon a number of grounds, some of which were that the lawsuit involved damage 
not caused by an "occurrence, " and also that it was questionable whether the lawsuit 
even involved "property damage." Finally, the letter states that for the aforementioned 
reasons and for other reasons which may become known, the defense of the action could 
not be considered a waiver.5 
Green further alleged that Traveler's Property & Casualty Company, the insurance 
carrier for Mr. Wall, the partner of Green, engaged the law firm of Richards, Brandt, 
Miller & Nelson to defend Mr. Wall in the Fennell action and also reserved its rights to 
deny coverage. Travelers, it is alleged with no support whatsoever, provided Wall with a 
defense through the conclusion of the Fennell lawsuit.6 (R.180). 
On September 6, 2000, State Farm indicated that there was no coverage under the 
policy and withdrew its defense. (R.251). Green also claimed in his opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment that he has incurred attorneys fees in excess of $50,000.00 
5Mr. Green never has argued in this case that State Farm has ever waived its right 
to deny coverage. 
6The allegation is made in the Statement of Facts but is not supported by affidavit, 
discovery, or any document. The contract language of Travelers was never supplied nor 
any other information which possibly could aid this or any other court in making any legal 
determination. 
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in arriving at a successful defense of the Fennell lawsuit after State Farm's withdrawal 
from the defense.7 (R.180). 
Course of Proceedings. Subsequent to State Farm's withdrawal of the defense in 
this matter, Edward Green and Ed Green Construction brought an action against State 
Farm for breach of the duty to defend, breach of contract, and bad faith seeking special, 
general, and punitive damages. (R.l). 
Following discovery, defendant State Farm brought a motion for summary 
judgment. (R.88). Green countered with a motion for summary judgment of his own. 
(R.l 75). The facts on State Farm's motion for summary judgment were not disputed by 
Green.8 In a ruling, (R.297) followed by an order of August 24, 2004, (R.300) the district 
court denied State Farm's motion for summary judgment and granted Green's motion. 
While not identifying any specific cause of action that is covered under the policy, the 
court ruled that certain unidentified claims in the Fennell complaint "potentially" could be 
covered by the policy at issue. See Ruling attached hereto as Addendum C. Although the 
7This allegation, likewise, is supported by no documentation, affidavit or discovery 
response. Further, this "fact" is in no way relevant to a determination of coverage. 
8First, Green failed to rebut the facts pursuant to Rule 7 of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Second, Green admitted the facts, although Green maintained that additional 
facts should be considered. State Farm properly rebutted Green's assertions pointing out 
that the proffered facts were inadmissible, immaterial, and for the most part irrelevant. 
For example, plaintiff attempted to supplement the record with claim file materials 
assessing the liability claim which made no determination as to coverage. The claim file 
materials provided which went directly to coverage showed State Farm's conclusion that 
no coverage attached. 
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parties had briefed the issues specific to the insuring clause of the insurance contract, as 
well as certain exclusions, the trial court did not address these in any particularity. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No "Occurrence." The allegations of the complaint do not constitute an 
"occurrence" under the policy. Unless the damages alleged in the underlying complaint 
were caused by an "occurrence," there is no coverage. This case is controlled by Nova 
Casualty Co. v. Able Const, 983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1999). Nova Casualty held that 
allegations of intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation in connection 
with the sale of property cannot constitute an "occurrence" in a general liability policy. 
The court relied on case law from other jurisdictions holding that intentional or fraudulent 
acts are deemed purposeful and therefore not covered. Nova Casualty specifically held 
that intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of warranty 
are not covered. These are essentially the exact same causes of action alleged by Fennell. 
Each of these causes of action include an element of intent to induce reliance on the part 
of Green. Nova Casualty joined other courts "which hold that allegations of negligent 
misrepresentation are not an occurrence or accident under commercial general liability 
insurance policies because the insured had the intent to induce reliance." 
Fennell claimed the defendant's failure to disclose led him to take certain actions, 
in this case purchasing the lot. Fennell maintained that had the information been 
disclosed, the property would not have been purchased. Thus, misrepresentation, whether 
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made by express statement or by silence, when couched in terms of failing to disclose 
results in the same attempt to induce reliance. There is no sound distinction between the 
giving of false information and the failure to give correct information. Silence is 
actionable where it relates to a material matter known to the party who has a duty to 
communicate the information to the other party. Mere inaction or silence amounts to both 
misrepresentation and concealment. 
The Nova Casualty analysis was followed in H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. North 
Pacific Ins. Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Utah 2002). HE. Davis held there was no 
occurrence where it was alleged that the insured had improperly performed site 
preparation, fill, and compaction of a lot where a school was supposed to be built. H.E. 
Davis also held that the allegations did not constitute "property damage" either. The 
court found that the plaintiffs damages were foreseeable economic losses, simply arising 
from the inadequate work, and therefore did not qualify as "property damage." 
Courts have also held that breach of warranty claims are basically breach of 
contract claims, do not constitute an occurrence, and are not covered. Fennell made no 
claim that any actions taken by Ed Green actually caused a landslide or earth movement. 
Instead, Fennell claimed that the non-disclosure of information resulted in his buying 
property he would not have otherwise purchased. Thus, there is no property damage 
caused by an accident and therefore no occurrence. As a result, there is no coverage 
under the policy. 
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Liability insurance policies are not performance bonds. While Utah courts have 
not addressed whether faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence under a contractor's 
policy, courts in other jurisdictions have held that such claims do not equate to an 
"occurrence." In the present case, the main complaints against Green were that he 
designated a lot as buildable when it was not, or at a minimum failed to note on the plat 
map of the subdivision that a concern had been raised by a geologist. In essence, Fennell 
claimed that Green did a bad job as a "professional subdivider." Lot 33 was susceptible to 
landslides to begin with. This fact was discovered by the geologist, and by Fennell's 
allegation, relayed to Green but not relayed further. Green in no way changed the 
character or composition of the land. Accordingly, the allegations do not describe an 
occurrence. Therefore, there is no coverage under the policy. 
No "Property Damage/9 The allegations of the underlying complaint do not 
constitute "property damage." In addition to showing an "occurrence" under the insuring 
clause of the policy, plaintiff also must show that the occurrence caused "property 
damage." This Green cannot do. The policy requires physical injury or destruction of 
property caused by an occurrence. Fennell's claims in the underlying complaint are for 
failure to disclose, not for any damage caused to tangible property. The lack of disclosure 
in no way resulted in the landslide. The Fennell complaint does not allege that Green 
caused the landslide, nor does the complaint allege that Green altered the lot. 
Case law from other jurisdictions supports that conclusion that property damage 
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cannot be found in this case. Courts have noted that in order to find property damage the 
policy infers that the property allegedly damaged has to have been undamaged or 
uninjured at some previous point in time. Fennell's complaint does not allege that the lot 
was in good condition at any time. Thus, no property damage can be shown and there 
exists no coverage. 
Diminution in value does not constitute property damage. Many courts have held 
that diminution in value does not constitute property damage and is therefore not covered. 
Courts have held that damage sought for misrepresentations regarding the value of 
property did not constitute property damage. It only constitutes economic loss. 
The same analysis applies here. Nowhere is it alleged that Green caused the 
landslide or caused any damage whatsoever. There exists no allegation that Green or 
anyone else acted in any way which caused Lot 31 to have the propensity to slide. 
Instead, FennelPs complaint alleges that a preexisting issue with the lot was not 
communicated. Thus, no property damage as that term is defined by the policy can be 
found. As a result, no coverage exists under the policy. 
The allegations of the Fennel! complaint are excluded by the policy. All three 
causes of action and their factual underpinnings are excluded by the professional services 
exclusion. The allegation of the complaint is expressly that Mr. Green failed to relay 
information in his professional capacity. Again, there is no complaint that any actual 
work on the lot was erroneously performed. Instead, the allegation is that the lot's 
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propensity for a landslide should have been disclosed. The non-disclosure of that 
information, or allowing the lot to be designated a building lot, is a mental task within the 
professional capacity of plaintiff. Fennell characterizes Mr. Green as a "professional 
subdivider," and indicates that he relied on the "professionalism and experience of the 
defendant." Fennell alleges that Green prepared and approved a plat map or drawing that 
failed to contain information Fennell thought should have been included. Such actions 
come squarely within the professional services exclusion. Of course, by its plain terms the 
exclusion is not limited to the specific actions listed in the exclusion, but for any 
professional services. 
While the term "professional services" is not defined by the policy, the exclusion is 
well recognized as being unambiguous by many courts. These same courts recognize that 
the term is not limited to services performed by persons who must be licensed by a 
government authority in order to practice their professions. Rather, it refers to any 
business activity conducted by the insured which involves specialized knowledge, labor, 
or skill, and is predominantly mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in 
nature. The exclusion clearly refers to the nature of the service provided, not to the 
nature of the service provider; and whether a particular service is professional in nature is 
not determined by whether the entity responsible for it also performs related non-
professional work. 
The allegations of wrongdoing in the underlying complaint are limited solely to 
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failure to transmit information. The decision on whether a lot is compatible with the 
building of a home is an action that is predominantly mental or intellectual. The decision 
whether to include information on a plat map is a professional activity and specifically 
identified in the exclusion. Such a construction of the professional services exclusion is 
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop, 709 
P.2d 389 (Utah 1985). 
The claims are also excluded by the "Expected or Intended" Exclusion. The policy 
contains an exclusion which provides: "This insurance does not apply to properly damage 
expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured." Obviously, to the extent that 
plaintiff in the underlying action was claiming an intentional act by Mr. Green, this 
exclusion applies. However, under the analysis of the court in Nova Casualty Co. v. Able 
Const., 983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1999), because intent can be inferred from the intent to 
induce action, even in a negligent misrepresentation context, all the causes of action 
would be excluded by this exclusion as well. 
ARGUMENT 
L COVERAGE MUST BE DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY 
REFERENCE TO THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE FENNELL 
COMPLAINT 
Interpretation of a contract is a legal conclusion. Nova Casualty Co. v. Able Const, 
983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1999). Likewise, the interpretation of policies of insurance are 
to be made by the court. Id. Accordingly, the present issues must be decided as a matter 
16 
of law. 
Recently, this court clarified how to review coverage questions under insurance 
policies. In Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 Utah App. 414, 487 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Nov. 28, 2003) 
the court of appeals reviewed a claim for coverage and stated that one looks to the four 
corners of the complaint to determine whether coverage exists as it relates to a lawsuit. 
Thus, the allegations which should be reviewed herein are those found in the underlying 
complaint. In fact, the only allegations of which Mr. Green was aware were those in the 
complaint. 
When an insured claims the right to recover under a policy of insurance and 
coverage is contested by the insurance company, the insured bears the burden of proving 
that the underlying events trigger coverage under the policy. Griffen v. Prudential Ins. of 
America, 133 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 1943); Browning v. Equitable Life Assur, Soc. of U.S., 
80 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1938); See also Wallen v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc., 900 P.2d 
619, 626 (Cal. 1995) (insured has the burden of showing that there has been an 
"occurrence" within the terms of a CGL policy). Green did not meet this burden as a 
matter of law. 
As pointed out in the statement of facts, no facts are known outside the four 
corners of the complaint. In fact, plaintiffs counsel stated expressly that Mr. Green's 
knowledge was limited to the four corners of the complaint. No relevant information 
outside of the four corners of the complaint as to Mr. Fennell's claims were brought 
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forward. No document proffered by plaintiff in the motions before the trial court 
addressed any actions of Green which are not described in the complaint. Thus, for a 
determination of coverage in the present circumstance, the four comers of the complaint 
constitute the entirety of the relevant information before the court. 
II. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
"OCCURRENCE" UNDER THE POLICY 
Under coverage L (Liability) Green's policy states: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury, property damage, personal injury or 
advertising injury to which this insurance applies. No other obligation or liability 
to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered unless explicitly provided for 
under Supplementary Payment. This insurance applies only: 
L to bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence which 
takes place in the coverage territory during the policy period[.] 
Therefore, unless the damages alleged in the underlying complaint were caused by 
an "occurrence", there is no coverage. The definition of "occurrence" in Green's policy 
states in pertinent part: 
Occurrence means: (a) an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions which result in bodily injury or 
property damage. 
Nothing in the insurance policy defines "accident," however Utah case law is 
helpful in this regard. 
The word [accident] is descriptive of means which produce effects which are not 
their natural and probable consequences . . . an effect which is the natural and 
probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident, nor s it 
produced by accidental means. It is either the result of actual design, or it falls 
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under the maxim that every man must be held to intend the natural and probable 
consequence of his deeds. 
Nova Casualty, 983 P.2d at 579 (quoting Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 200 P. 
1017 (Utah 1921)). 
The Nova Casualty case recently held that allegations of intentional 
misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation in connection with the sale of property 
cannot constitute an "occurrence" in a commercial general liability policy. In reaching its 
holding, the court relied on case law from several other jurisdictions holding that 
intentional or fraudulent acts are deemed purposeful and therefore not covered under a 
CGL (Commercial General Liability) policy. Nova Casualty, 983 P.2d at 579. Each of 
the causes of action in the underlying complaint include an element of intent on the part 
of Green in causing the alleged damages. Accordingly, based on the holding of Nova 
Casualty, none of these allegations or causes of action amount to an "occurrence" under 
plaintiffs policy, and thus cannot afford coverage to Green. 
The Nova Casualty case is exactly on point. Nova Casualty involved a 
commercial liability policy with language similar to the policy here. The three primary 
claims presented in Nova Casualty were negligent misrepresentation, intentional 
misrepresentation, and breach of a warranty. The underlying reason for the decision in 
Nova Casualty is that the court found that a defendant's actions were alleged to have 
induced action or inaction by the other party. The intent to induce led the court to 
conclude that an occurrence could not be found. The court stated: 
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Considering the intentional misrepresentation allegations in light of the law, we 
agree with the trial court that they do not amount to an "occurrence." The trial 
court reasoned that: 
It appears that the closing of the Killpack/Edmonds home business was the 
"natural and probable consequence" of Abel's representations and it was very 
likely that such result would occur if such representations were to be untrue as they 
seem to have been. 
The Nova Casualty court then cites to numerous jurisdictions which have held that 
misrepresentations do not constitute an occurrence. The Nova Casualty court likewise 
found that the negligent misrepresentation claims were not an occurrence either 
Interestingly, the trial court had found that the negligent misrepresentation claims did 
constitute an occurrence. However, the Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that such 
allegations do not constitute an occurrence and aligned itself with California courts 
"which hold that allegations of negligent misrepresentation are not an occurrence or 
accident under commercial general liability insurance policies because the insured had the 
intent to induce reliance." 
[NJegligent misrepresentations causing investment loss or loss of other economic 
interests are considered purposeful rather than accidental for the purpose of 
insurance coverage.. .. The underlying rational of this rule is that the negligent 
misrepresentation requires intent to induce reliance and, therefore, is a subspecies 
or variety of fraud which is excluded from the policy coverage. 
Id. at 580 (quoting Dykstra v. Foremost Ins. Co., 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 545 (1993)).9 The 
9Other courts have likewise held that negligent misrepresentation requires a 
plaintiff to prove an intent to induce reliance rendering the misrepresentations non-
accidental and outside the scope of an occurrence. Tischimperle v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 529 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. App. 1995); Farr v. Designer Phosphate & Premix Intern., 
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same reasoning applies here. The causes of action identified as failure to disclose are in 
reality simply misrepresentation claims. The plaintiff in the Fennell lawsuit was claiming 
the defendant's failure to disclose led him to take certain actions, in this case purchasing 
the lot. Plaintiff in the Fennell lawsuit maintains that had the information been disclosed, 
the property would not have been purchased. Thus, misrepresentation, whether made by 
express statement or by silence, when couched in terms of failing to disclose results in the 
same attempt to induce reliance. "[TJhere can be no sound distinction between the giving 
of false information and the failure to give correct information^]" Pepper v. Zion 's First 
Nat. Bank, N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 149 (Utah 1990). "Silence may become actionable fraud 
where it relates to a material matter known to the party and which it is his duty to 
communicate to the other contracting party as a result of a relation of trust or inequality of 
condition and knowledge." Utah National Bank v. Oliver, 523 P.2d 1222 (Utah 1974) 
(referencing Elder v. Carlson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963)). "It is almost unnecessary to 
add that mere inaction or silence may, under particular circumstances, amount to both 
misrepresentation and concealment[.]" Utah Sate Building Comm. v. Great American 
Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 140 P.2d 763, 771 (1943) (quoting Hilton v. Sloan, 37 Utah 
359, 373, 108 P. 689, 694 (1910)). Accordingly, Green's failure to disclose a known fact 
Inc., 570 N.W.2d 320 (Neb. 1997); First Wyo. Bank NA. v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 
P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1993). See also Bush v. Shoe-maker-Beal, 987 P.2d 1103 (Kan. App. 
1999)(failure to disclose termite damage not accident, therefore not occurrence, hence not 
covered). 
21 
was a misrepresentation as to the lot's suitability for building. 
In Safeco Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 915 P.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1990) a property purchaser 
claimed that a seller misrepresented the condition of property, particularly that the 
property suffered from, among other things, unstable earth. The court held that Ihe 
misrepresentations did not constitute an occurrence and therefore there was no coverage. 
See also Freedman v. Cigna Ins. Co. of Texas, 976 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App. 1998)(failure 
to disclose leaky roof not an accident); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 134 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 
App. 2003)(failure to disclose information about real property not an occurrence). The 
same result should attach here. Failure to disclose, upon which all of Fennell's claims 
rest, is not accidental as a matter of law, and therefore, not an occurrence Accordingly, 
no coverage exists. 
The Nova Casualty court held that breach of implied warranty claims were 
likewise not covered. The court invoked the economic loss rule in finding that coverage 
did not exist, that is, breach of warranty claims allege only economic loss. Ed Green 
actually prevailed in the Fennell lawsuit by showing that plaintiffs claims were barred 
under the economic loss rule. If the claims are barred under the economic loss rule, they 
would likewise fail to be covered under that same rule. It is impossible for Mr. Green to 
argue otherwise. In the end, Nova Casualty controls this case completely. The three 
causes of action which were found not covered in Nova Casualty are almost identical to 
the three causes of action in the Fennell complaint. In either case the same result obtains: 
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there is no coverage. 
The Nova Casualty analysis was followed by the Federal District Court sitting in 
Utah in H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 248 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Utah 
2002). In H.E. Davis, the court followed Nova Casualty holding that the allegations of a 
claimant did not constitute an occurrence. H.E. Davis involved allegations that the 
insured had improperly performed site preparation, fill, and compaction of a lot where a 
school was supposed to be built. The Federal District Court cited the case of Swarts v. 
Woodlawn, Inc., 610 So. 2d 888, 890 (La. Ct. App. 1992) which held that where policies 
define occurrence as an accident, courts have refused to find an occurrence when a 
contractor's liability is based only on improper construction. Further, the court in H.E. 
Davis held that the allegation did not constitute an occurrence under the policy and also 
did not constitute property damage either. The court found that the plaintiffs damages 
were foreseeable economic losses, simply arising from the inadequate work, and therefore 
did not qualify as "property damage." 
Courts have also held that breach of warranty claims are basically breach of 
contract claims and are not covered. See Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Tooele, 947 F. Supp. 
1557, 1564 (N.D. Ala. 1996). Other courts have held that breach of warranty claims do 
not constitute an occurrence. Hawkeye A. Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 6 S.W. 3d 419, 426 
(Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1999) ( no coverage for breach of express and implied warranties 
because "breach of a defined contractual duty cannot fall within the term 'accident.'"); 
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Wausau, Inc. v. County Concrete Corp., 226 Wis. 2d 235, 593 N.W. 2d 445 (1999) 
("breach of contract or warranty is not a covered 'occurrence'"); Yegge v. Integrity Mut. 
Ins. Co., 534 N.W. 2d 100, 102-3 (Iowa 1995) (claims for breach of contract and breach 
of warranty did not involve an "occurrence"). 
Thus, the allegations of the Fennell complaint constitute neither an occuirence nor 
property damage caused by an accident. Fennell made no claim that any actions taken by 
Ed Green actually caused a landslide or earth movement. Instead, Fennell claimed that 
the non-disclosure of information resulted in his buying property he would not have 
otherwise purchased. Thus, there is no property damage caused by an accident and 
therefore no occurrence. As a result, there is no coverage under the policy. 
III. GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES DO NOT, AND ARE NOT 
INTENDED.TO COVER THE WORK OF A CONTRACTOR 
Liability insurance policies are not performance bonds. While Utah courts 
have not addressed whether faulty workmanship constitutes an occurrence under a 
contractor's policy, courts in other jurisdictions have held that such claims do not equate 
to an "occurrence." In the present case, the main complaints against Green were that he 
designated a lot as buildable when it was not, or at a minimum failed to note on the plat 
map of the subdivision that a concern had been raised by a geologist. In essence Fennell 
claimed that Green did a bad job as a "professional subdivider." 
In Oak Crest Constr. Co. v. Austin Mutual Ins.. 905 P.2d 848 (Or. App. 1995), a the 
contractor brought suit against a commercial liability insurer for breach of insurance 
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policy after the insurer refused to pay a claim arising out of a subcontractor's application 
of paint to wood work which failed to cure properly. The definition of "occurrence" in 
the policy at issue in Oak Crest is almost identical to the language at issue here: "an 
accident includes repeated exposure to similar conditions". The policy did not define 
accident. Oak Crest 905 P.2d at 850. In Oak Crest, the plaintiff did not dispute that the 
subcontractor intended to apply the paint, but argued that the term "accident" should be 
broadly construed to include the unintended consequences of intended acts. The Oak 
Crest court denied this reasoning stating: 
The policy requires that the property damage be caused by an accident, not that the 
property damage itself Z?^  an accident. Id (emphasis in original). 
In this case, the property damage was not the result of an unexpected event; the 
property damage was itself the unexpected event. Thus, even under Plaintiffs 
reading of the policy, the property damage was not caused by an accident; it was 
undisputedly caused by the subcontractor's intentional act. Id. 
Like the policy in Oak Crest, the policy language here states that the insurance 
applies to property damage caused by an accident, not that the property damage itself be 
an accident. 
Many other courts have held that claims of defective or poor workmanship do not 
constitute an "occurrence." Indiana Ins. Co v. Hydra Corp., 615 N.E.2d 70, 73 (111. App 
1993); Jakobson Shipyard, Inc. v. Aetna Cas & Sur Co, 961 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(New York law)(defective steering mechanism installed into boats not "occurrence"); 
Portal Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 845 P.2d 746 (Mont. 1993)(negligence claims 
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against a pipeline operator not an "occurrence"); Hawkeye-Sec Ins. Co. v. Vector Constr. 
Co, 460 N.W.2d 329, 334 (Mich. 1990) (concrete subcontractor's defective workmanship 
not a result of an "occurrence"); Wm. C Vick Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut, 52 
F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.N.C. 1999)(performance of faulty workmanship did not constitute 
"occurrence" under CGL policies); Harrison Plumbing & Heating v. New Hampshire Ins. 
Group, 681 P.2d 875 (Wash. App. 1984); US. Fidelity & Guar. Corp. v. Advance 
Roofing& Supply Co., 788 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. App. 1989) (faulty workmanship was not an 
"occurrence" within policy definition). 
No "occurrence" can be found in the present case for the same reason. There is no 
allegation anywhere that Green was engaged in anything other than his activities as a 
developer. As stated, the most that can be garnered from the Fennell complaint is that 
Green designated a lot as buildable when it was not, or at a minimum, failed to note on 
the plat map of the subdivision that a concern has been raised by a geologist. In essence, 
Fennell claimed that Green did a bad job as a "professional subdivides" The land at issue 
was susceptible to landslides to begin with. This fact was discovered by the geologist, 
and by Fennell's allegation, relayed to Green but not relayed further. Thus, Green in no 
way changed the character or composition of the land. Accordingly, these allegations do 
not describe an occurrence. Therefore, there is no coverage under the policy. 
IV. THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE "PROPERTY DAMAGE" 
Green's policy states in pertinent part: 
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This insurance applies only: 
to bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence which takes place 
in the coverage territory during the policy period; 
Green's policy, pg. 18. Thus, in addition to showing an "occurrence" under the insuring 
clause of the policy, plaintiff also must show that the occurrence caused "property 
damage." This the plaintiff cannot do as a matter of law. 
Green's policy defines "property damage" as: 
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property, including all resulting 
loss of use of that properly; or 
(2) loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured or destroyed, 
provided such loss of use is caused by physical injury to or destruction of 
other tangible property. 
Green's policy, pg. 30. Thus, the policy requires physical injury or destruction of 
property caused by the occurrence. As mentioned previously, Fennell's claims in the 
underlying complaint are for failure to disclose, not for any damage caused. The lack of 
disclosure in no way resulted in the landslide. The Fennell complaint does not allege that 
Green caused the landslide, nor does the complaint allege that Green altered the lot in any 
manner. 
Case law from other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that property damage 
cannot be found in this case. In Vick Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 52 
F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.N.C. 1999), after reviewing a definition of property damage 
substantially similar to the one at issue here, the court stated: 
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These requirements, in the court's opinion, infer that the property allegedly 
damaged has to have been undamaged or uninjured at some previous point in time. 
This is inconsistent with the allegations that the subject property was never 
constructed properly in the first place. 
Id. at 582. The Vick Const. Co. court then concluded that allegations of poor workmanship 
do not constitute "property damage." Id. at 583. See also Reliance Ins. Co, v. Mogavero, 
640 F.Supp. 84, 86 (D. Md. 1986) ("Property damage" has been defined to exclude 
defective work performed by the insured.). Fennell's complaint does not allege that the lot 
was in good condition at any time. Instead, the complaint alleges that the lot always 
possessed the propensity to slide and that the knowledge of the propensity to slide was 
withheld. Reference to the Fennell complaint exhibits no allegation of property damage. 
Fennell does not claim any action of Mr. Green caused any physical damage. Instead, the 
complaint maintains that Green withheld vital information about the propensity of a 
building lot for earth movement. Thus, no property damage can be shown and there exists 
no coverage. 
Diminution in Value Does Not Constitute Property Damage. Ed Green, through 
his attorneys, argued in the Utah Court of Appeals that the underlying Fennell complaint 
should be dismissed under the economic loss doctrine. The economic loss doctrine 
precludes claims which only allege diminution in value. 
Many courts have held that diminution in value does not constitute property damage 
and is therefore not covered. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 
F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir. (Okla.) 1988) (The definition of property damage was intended to 
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preclude coverage for intangible injuries such as diminution in value); Hawaiian Ins. & 
Guar. Co. v. Blair, 726, P.2d 1310, 1313-15 (Haw. App. 1986) (diminution in value does 
not constitute loss of use); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Viera, 930 F2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 
1991)(California law) (diminution in value not covered); and Aetna Life & Cas. v. Patrick 
Indus., 645 N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ind. App 1995) (diminution in value not covered). 
These same arguments as to diminution of value go to representations as well. The 
court in Benjamin v. Dohm, 525 N.W. 2d 375 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) held that damage 
sought for misrepresentations regarding the value of property did not constitute property 
damage. It only constitutes economic loss. Likewise in M.L. Foss, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual 
Ins. Co., 885 P.2d 284 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994), the court held: 
The underlying complaint alleged purely economic losses resulting from the alleged 
non-disclosure of material facts in connection with the sale. Purely economic losses 
do not constitute "property damage." 
See also American States Ins. Co. v. Martin, 662 So.2d 245, 248, 249 (Ala. 1995). 
In State Farm Lloyds v. Kessler, 932 S.W. 2d 732, 737 (Tex. App. 1996), a 
complaint described property that had been physically injured. The insured, however, was 
not being sued on the basis that they caused the property damage, instead they were being 
sued on the grounds that they misrepresented the fact that no property damage had 
previously taken place. The court therefore properly held no property damage was alleged 
that could create insurance coverage. 
The same analysis applies here. Nowhere is it alleged that Green caused the 
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landslide or caused any damage whatsoever. There exists no allegation that Green or 
anyone else acted in any way which caused Lot 31 to have the propensity to slide. Instead, 
Fenneirs complaint alleges that a preexisting issue with the lot was not communicated. 
Thus, no property damage as that term is defined by the policy can be found. As a result, 
no coverage exists under the policy. 
Accordingly, looking at the four comers of the complaint, there is no allegation of 
an occurrence or property damage and therefore coverage cannot be found. 
V. EVEN IF AN "OCCURRENCE" OR "PROPERTY DAMAGE" COULD BE 
FOUND, THE CLAIMS IN THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT ARE 
EXCLUDED 
All three causes of action are excluded by the professional services exclusion. 
Further, all three causes of action are excluded by the expected or intended exclusion. 
AH three causes of action and their factual underpinnings are excluded by the 
professional services exclusion. The professional services exclusion provides: 
[T]his insurance does not apply: 
10. to bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury due to 
rendering or failure to render any professional services or treatments. 
This includes but is not limited to: 
b. engineering, drafting, surveying or architectural services, 
including preparing, approving, or failing to prepare or approve 
maps, drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, 
designs or specifications[.] 
The allegation of the complaint is that Mr. Green failed to relay information in his 
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professional capacity. Again, there is no complaint that any actual work on the lot was 
erroneously performed. Instead, the allegation is that the lot's propensity for a landslide 
should have been disclosed. The non-disclosure of that information, or allowing the lot to 
be designated a building lot, is a mental task within the professional capacity of plaintiff 
The underlying complaint directly triggers this exclusion by claiming Green's actions or 
inactions concerning the lot were in a professional capacity. Fennell characterizes Mr. 
Green as a "professional subdivider," and that he relied on the "professionalism and 
experience of the defendant." See ^ 12 Fennell Complaint. 
Further, Fennell specifically alleged: 
The Subdivision Plat of the land comprising Falcon Ridge Phase 2 was 
recorded by defendants Green and Wall on April 22, 1994. Lot 31 was 
designated as a building lot without containing the information and 
recommendation of the geologist aforesaid. 
(R.50,^ J 8). In other words, Fennell alleges that Green prepared and approved a plat map or 
drawing that failed to contain information Fennell thought should have been included. 
Such actions come squarely within the professional services exclusion. Of course, by its 
plain terms the exclusion is not limited to the specific actions listed in the exclusion, but 
for any professional services. 
While the term professional services is not defined by the policy, the exclusion is 
well recognized as being unambiguous by many courts. Hollingsworth v. Commercial 
Union Ins, Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 800, 256 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360-61 (Cal. App. 1989); 
Shepardson Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. The Continental Ins. Co., 21 F3d 1115 (9th Cir. 
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1994); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dannenfeldt, 778 F. Supp. 484, 495-97 (D.Ariz. 1991); 
Harbor Ins. Co. v. Omni Constr., Inc., 286 U.S. App. D.C. 166, 912 F.2d 1520 (D.C. Cir. 
1990); State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alpha Engineering Servs., Ins., 542 S.E.2d 876 (W. Va. 
2000). 
The court in State St Bank & Trust Co. v. IN A Ins. Co., 207 111. App. 3d 961, 567 
N.E. 2d 42, 47 (1991) explained: 
The policy at issue excludes liability coverage for personal injury or property 
damage due to the insured's rendering of or failure to render "any professional 
service." In construing exclusions such as this, courts have adopted an expansive 
definition of the term "professional service." The term is not limited to sei vices 
performed by persons who must be licensed by a government authority in order to 
practice their professions. Rather, it refers to any business activity conducted by the 
insured which involves specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and is predominantly 
mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in nature. 
The Harbor Ins. Court explained: 
The exclusion clearly refers to the nature of the service provided, not to the nature 
of the service provider; and whether a particular service is professional in nature is 
not determined by whether the entity responsible for it also performs related non-
professional work 
912 F.2d 1520, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
In State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alpha Engineering Servs., Ins., 542 S.E.2d 876 (W. 
Va. 2000) one mining company was to supply to another mining company with accurate 
and dependable mine maps. After the mining company who received the maps cut through 
old mining operations and flooded their operations on two occasions, a lawsuit followed. 
The insurance carrier for the mining company which was to supply the maps disclaimed 
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coverage under a professional services exclusion seemingly identical to State Farm's. The 
trial court granted a motion for summary judgment that because of the exclusion no 
coverage applied and the duty to defend did not attach. The supreme court of West 
Virginia affirmed. Not only did the court find the exclusion unambiguous, but also found 
that it did not matter whether the actual work was performed by the insured or a 
subcontractor. 
In the present circumstances, State Farm's exclusion is identical. Further, the 
allegations of wrongdoing in the underlying complaint are limited solely for failure to 
transmit information. The decision on whether a lot is compatible with the building of a 
home is an action that is predominantly mental or intellectual. The decision whether to 
include information on a plat map is a professional activity and specifically identified in 
the exclusion. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Fire Ins. Exchange v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389 (Utah 1985) 
reviewed a claim under a homeowner's policy which involved an exclusion for rendering 
or failure to render professional services. The court noted in applying the policy's 
exclusion to the insured's conduct, "the emphasis should be placed on the alleged activities 
or admissions of the insured which give rise to the claim and not upon the claimant's 
characterization of her legal theories of liability." In Alsop, a chiropractor was sued for 
chiropractic care given during a birthing process. The court found chiropractic care to be a 
professional service and as a result excluded by the policy. 
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In the present circumstances, all the claims arise out of a false designation for this 
property as a building lot or failure to disclose pertinent information regarding whether it 
was suitable as a lot. In such capacity, Green was operating as a developer rendering 
professional services of determining how to divide up lots and where it was appropriate to 
build houses. In connection with those determinations, the proper information was relayed 
to the city, plats and other information where filed where appropriate, and the lots where 
then sold. Thus, the activities of which the plaintiffs in the underlying action complain are 
primarily intellectual in nature and constitute professional services, which are exc luded. 
No coverage exists and the duty to defend was not triggered. 
The claims are also excluded by the Expected or Intended Exclusion. The 
policy at issue contains an exclusion, exclusion l.a., which provides: "This insurance does 
not apply to property damage expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured." 
Obviously, to the extent that plaintiff in the underlying action was claiming an intentional 
act by Mr. Green, this exclusion applies. However, under the analysis of the court in Nova 
Casualty Co. v. Able Const, 983 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1999), because intent can be inferred 
from the intent to induce action, even in a negligent misrepresentation context, all the 
causes of action would be excluded by this exclusion as well. 
CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the district court must be reversed and judgment granted in State 
Farm's favor. The allegations of the Fennell complaint constitute neither an "occurrence" 
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nor "property damage." Further, the actions or non-actions of Green alleged in the 
complaint are excluded by the policy. In sum, there is no coverage under the policy for the 
allegations of the Fennell complaint. Accordingly, no duty to defend exists. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 14th day of January, 2005. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD D. GREEN, an individual, and ED 
GREEN CONSTRUCTION, IMC, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation; and 
STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 020902692 
Judge Stephen L, Henriod 
This matter came befcre the Court on Plaintiffs' Edward D. Green and Ed Green 
Construction, Inc. (hereinafter c: llectively referred to as "Green") and Defendants' State Farm Fire 
& Casualty Company and State ]:arm General Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "State Farm") cross mouois for summary judgment regarding Defendants' duty to defend 
Plaintiffs from claims asserted b > James Fennel. The matter was fully briefed and was orally argued 
on May 10,2004. The Court took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a minute 
entry. Being fully advised and based upon the arguments of counsel and the law, the Court now 
finds and rules as follows: 
The question presented by this case is whether State Farm had a duty to defend Green from 
the claims asserted by James Fer uel. Green's liability for Fennel' s claims is not an i ssue in this case. 
Stat^Fann's duty to defend is breeder thtin its duty to indemnify. 
Fennel's Complaint asserts claims which could potentially trigger coverage under the policy. 
State Farm' s refusal to provide Green with a defense was a violation of its duty to defend and 
it, therefore, is obligated to reimburse Green for his costs, expenses, losses, injuries and damages 
resulting from its failure to pro\: de a defense in the case of James Fennel v. Ed Green, et al 
Because State Farm was obligated to defend Green it is, therefore, ordered that Green's 
Motion for S ummary Judgment i w granted and State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
denied 
DATED this *?*] day cl h\ /A Q - , 2004 r BY THE COURT: 
kl ^Jpt°he» L - Hc/iro id 
Honoi 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
l rable Stephen L, Henriod 
District Court Judge /"* ,y 
David N. Mortensen 




Attorney &r Plaintiff 
2485 Grant Avinue 
Suite 200 
Ogden,X3T 84401 
Telephone; (80t) 621-3646 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DmWCT COURT IN AND 
FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 Q Q 
JAMES ASHLEY FENNELL, H, 
P la int 
vs. 
EDWARD D. GREEN, NEIL WALL, a/k/a 
NEIL J. WALL and GMW DEVELOPMENT, 
INO, d/b/a IVORY NORTH, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
(JURY T&IAL DEMANDED) 
Civil No. flOOUoO^ Pb 
Judge jVur>WAft « f l ^ y -
Plaintiff, by aod through, ins counsel of record, hereby complains against Defendants and 
alleges as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
iA l. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties airilaiscMeptiKuaat to 78-3-*, Utah 
Code Annotated. 





f 3, Plaintiff is a resident of Layton City, Davis County, State of Utah and is the owner of 
and has lawfiii possession of land and premises at 1543 North 1050 East, more particularly 
dc3cribod as Lot 31, Falcon Ridge Phase 2, Layton City Davis County, Utah, according to the 
official plat thereof, l i e property is hereinafter sometimes called "Lot 31," 
4* On information and belief Defendants Edward D. Green and Neil Wall, a/k/a Neil I 
Wall, are residents of Davis County, State of Utah and are hereinafter sometimes called "Green 
and WalL" At all relevant times Defendants Green and Wall ware partners or joint venturers, and 
professional subdivides of land for the subdivision and sale of lots for residential purposes in 
Davis County, Utah* known as Falcon Ridge Phase 2, 
5. Defendant GMW Development, Inc. d/b/a Ivory North, hereinafter sometimes called 
"GMW," is a coiporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of 
Utah, with one of its places of business at Davis County State of Utah. On information and 
belief at all relevant times, GMW, a professional real estate developer and home builder WJLS 
developing the lots in the Falcon Ridge Subdivision foe sale and for The construction of homes 
thereon for its customers, 
\ ^ &" Part of the area of the land subdivided as Falcon Ridge Phase 2, including Lot 31, is 
subject to landslides and erosion. The feet that the land is subject to landslides and erosion was 




known or should have been known to Defendants as professional subdividers, developers, sellers, 
and builders but is a condition not apparent to the general public nor to Plaintiff nor known by 
Plaintffi 
7. AS a pan of the subdivision prucxss for Faluun Ridge Phase 2, Defendants Grsan and 
Wall hired a professional geologist to conduct a Geological Soils Investigation of the area and 
received reports of the investigation dated October 7,1992 and October 9,1992. The reports, 
among other Hungs, indicate the presence of a landslide and sloughing at the site of what is now 
designated as Lot 31. To address and mitigate the landslide and sloughing problem, the report 
recouiuieuded that a 20 foot wide road right-of-way be placed inside the top of th« scarp on Lot 
31. 
8. The Subdivision Plat of the land comprising Falcon Ridge Phase 2 was recorded by 
Defendants Green and Wall on April 22,1994. Lot 31 was designated as a building lot without 
containing the information and recommendation of the geologist aforesaid , 
9 Prior to July 5,1995, Defendant GMW contracted with Plaintiff for the acquisition of 
Lot 31 fioin Defendants Green and Wall and for the construction of a home thereon for Plaintiff 
byDefeidaatGMW. 
10, On My 5,1995, Defendant GMW applied &r a building permit Scorn Layton City for 
the construction of the home at Lot 31; received title from Green and Wall by deed dated My 7, 




1995, recorded M y 12,1995; located and placed on the lot and constructed a home theteon for 
Plaintiff and convoyed title to Plaintiff by deed dated December 22, 1995, retarded December 
22,1995. Plaintiff moved into the home where he presently resides. 
11. Attihe time of the Subdividing of the Falcon Ridge property and the recording of the 
Subdivision Plat, and prior thereto, Defendants Green and Wall knew that Lot 31 was intended 
for site far tije construction of a home thereon; that it would foreseeable be sold to a person such 
as Plaintiff for the purpose of construction of a home thereon. At the time of the transaction on 
the lot with Plaintiff, Defendant GMW, knew Plaintiff intended to construct a home thereoa, 
12. In purchasing Lot 31 and constructing a home thereon, Plaintiff relied on the 
professionalism and experience of Defendants that the lot was reasonably suitable for the 
construction of an ordinaiy home thereon, and relied on the lack of any information that the lot 
was subject to landslides and erosion. 
13. On April 14,1998, a landslide occurred at Lot 31 damaging the lot and placing the 
home in jeupardy of damage, to Plaintiff substantial damage. 
14. At all relevant times, Defendants knew or should have known, through die exercise 
of reasonable care in using appropriate testing methods and reviewing available geological data 
that Lot 31 was the site of a natural geological area subject to landslides and erosion. Defendants 
Green and Wall knew that the geologist recommended a road right-of-way be placed on Lot 31 to 




address and mitigate the landslide and erosion problem. "Whereas, Plaintiff had no knowledge of 
such matters nor should he have known until the landslide on April 14,1998, 
FIRST CLAIM FOR REUEF 
Negligent Failure to Disclose 
15* Plaintiff incorporates, by reference herein, all preceding paragraphs of this 
Complaint 
16. At all relevant times, Defendants Green and Wall had the duty to Plaintiff to disclose 
to him fully and accurately the physical characterLstics of Lot 31; to make lenown to Mm all 
uausual and material diCTmsranscs of Lot 31; to inform him that Lot 31 was the site of 
landslides and erosion and that the geologist recammended.tfaat a road right-of-way be planed on 
Lot 31 to address the landslide and erosion problem. 
17. At all relevant times, Defendant GMW had the duty to Plaintiff to disclose to bam 
that Lot 31 was the site of landslides and erosion* 
18. Defendants negligently breached their duties to Plaintiff to male* the disclosures 
aforesaid. 
19. In purchasing Lot 31 and constructing a home thereon, Plaintiff relied on the lack of 
disclosures from Defendants thai Lot 31 was other than suitable for housing. Plaintiff relied on 
lack of disclosure fiom Defendants that Lot 31 was the site of landslides and erosioa Plaintiff 




relied on lack of disclose irom Defendants Gieen and Wall that the geologist recommended a 
road right-of-way be placed at die site of T,nt 31 to address the landslide and erosion problem. 
Had the disclosures all of which arc material been mado aa they should have bean, Plaintiff 
would not have purchased this lot nor constructed a home tbereon. 
20. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of duties to disclose, Plaintiff has 
suffered and mil suffer substantial damages and is entitled to judgment against Defendants in 
full and complete compensation recoverable by law, including special and general damages in 
amounts to be determined attrial3 and for equitable relief 
SECOND CLAIM FOR SELTEF 
Intentional Failure to Disclose 
21. Plaintiff incorporates, by reference herein, ail preceding paragraphs of this 
Complaint. 
22. At all relevant times, Defendants Green and Wall had actual knowledge that Lot 31 
was located in an area of landslide and erosion and that the geologist T^nommended that a road 
right-ofcway be placed thereon to address the landslide and erosion problem and had the duty to 
Plaintiff to disclose to him this information and to disclose to him the geologist's reports. 
23. Defendants Green and Wall intentionally, wrongfully, and wilfully breached thair 
duty to make the disclosures aforesaid to Plaintiff, which axe material, and wrongfully and 




wiifikly withheld this information from Plaintiff. 
24. The acts and omission gf Defendants Green and. Wall In light of the knowledge and 
Information they possessed constitutes gross and intentional misconduct which manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference towards the rights of Plaintiff. 
25. In purchasing Lot 31 and constructing a home thereon, Plaintiff relied on the lack of 
disclosure by Defendants Gzeea and Wall that the lot was the site of land slides and erosion. 
Plaintiff relied on Uck of disclosure from Defendants Green and Wall that the geologist 
recommended a road right-of-way be placed at the site of Lot 31 to address the landslide and 
erosion problem. Had the disclosures all of which are material been made as they should have 
been, Plaintiff would not have purchased this lot nor constructed a home thereon. 
26. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants Green and Wall's intentional Mure 
to disclose aforesaid and gross misconduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will suffer substantial 
damages and is entitied to judgment against Defendants in Ml and complete compensation for all 
damages twovecaM* by law including special and general damages in amounts and sums to be 
determined at the time of trial, and equitable relief. The gross misconduct of Defendants Green 
and Wall justifies and warrants the imposition of exemplary coinages by which such activities in 
the future would be discouraged and not replicated and others would not be subject to such 
injury. 




THIRD CLAIM *VK HEUEF 
Breach of Implied Warranty 
27. Plaintiff incorporates, by reference herein, all preceding paragraphs of this 
Complaint 
28. In subdividing the land and platting Lot 31 as a site for a residential structure, 
Defendants Green and Wall impliedly warranted to PlaintilFdiat said lot was reasonably fit a&d 
suitable for ordinary housing. 
29. In aelling Lot 31 to Plaintiff and contracting to construct a home thereon for Plaintiff; 
Defendant GMW impliedlyWarranted to Plaintiff that said lot was reasonably fit and suitable for 
ordinary housing. * 
30. In purchasing Lot 31 and construction a home thereon, Plaintiff relied on the implicit 
warranties. 
31. Defendants breached the warranties aforesaid in that said lot was not and is not 
reasonably fit and suitable for ordinary housing, 
32. On April 14,1998, the lot was the location of a landslide damaging the lot and 
placing the home thereon in jeopardy of damage and destruction. 
33. As a direct proximate result of the bieacbes of warranty, PimntifThas teen damaged 
and has suffered and will suffer substantial damages and is entitled to judgment against 




Defendants in full and complete compensation on all damages reasonable by law and which 
include spedal and general damages in amounts and sums to be determined at the time of txiai. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays fiir judgment Defendants a* follows: 
1. Under Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief: 
(a) for all damages as are recoverable under law, including special and general damages 
suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendants' Mure to disclose; 
(b) for costs and attorney's fees; and 
(c) for suck other and Anther relief as is deemed just and proper in &e premises. 
2. Under Fkiotiffs Second Claim for Relief: 
(a) for all damages as are recoverable under law, including special and general damages 
suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendants Green and Wall's gross misconduct; 
(b) for eatemplary damages in an amount to be deteraiiusdattriatf;. 
(c) for costs and attorney's fees; and 
(d) for such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper in the premises. 
3. yndbrPkiuiifPsIliird Claim for Relief: 
(a) for ail damages as are recoverable under law, including special' and general damages 
suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Defendants' breach of warranty; 
(b)' for costs and attorney's fees; and 




(c) Far such other and further relief as is deemed just and proper in the premises. 
JURYDEAiAND 
tfaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury of all issues that may be submitted to a jury. 
DATED*** 7* day of April, 2000, P. 
^y^f^A. 
LavarE. Stark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Addendum C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
EDWARD D. GREEN, an individual 
and ED GREEN CONSTRUCTION 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Illinois 
corporation; and STATE FARM 




CASE NO. 020902692 
JUDGE STEPHEN L, HENRIOD 
This matter is before the above entitled Court on the parties' 
cross motions for summary judgment. Oral arguments were heard on 
May 10, 2004, at 9:00 a.m. At the conclusion of arguments, the 
Court took the matter under advisement. Now, having reviewed the 
parties1 arguments along with the relevant legal authorities the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
The real issue before this Court is not a determination of 
liability, but an analysis of the protections extended by State 
Farm to Ed Green via the terms of the parties1 insurance contract. 
In this case, the Court finds that State Farm's duty to defend is 
much broader than its duty to indemnify. Accordingly, because 
Fennellf s complaint includes claims which could potentially trigger 
GREEN V. STATE FARM PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
coverage under the policy, St&te'Farm is obligated to reimburse Mr 
Green for his costs, expenses, losses, injuries and damages 
resulting from its failure to ^ provide a defense in the case of 
James Fenell v Ed Green et. al. 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Defendants1 motion for summary judgment denied. Plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare an Order consistent with this Minute Entry. 
Dated this (j day of Jj*£y, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
foregoing MINUTE ENTRY, to -the following, this 
of
 QiH^ > 2004: 
David Mortensen 
Ivie & Young 
226 West 2230 North, Suite 110 
PO Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Steven B Smith 
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50 South Main Street, Suite 950 
PO Box 11429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
